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Abstract
We take th e  F u jita  & Thisse (2003) grow th-cum -geography m odel to  
investigate th e  effect of m igration  and  enduring  social re lationships on 
regional p roduction  and  grow th. We assert th a t  m igration  is an  im ­
p o rta n t fac to r to  overcome th e  d istance  decay effect of cross-regional 
knowledge spillovers, while social ties determ ine th e  ex ten t to  which 
th is is th e  case. O ur resu lts show th a t  w hen m igration  and  social ties 
are im p o rtan t for generating  knowledge spillovers, th e  full agglom era­
tio n  of high-skilled R&D workers is no t a t all certain . T he equilibrium  
w ith  an  equally  d ispersed  high-skilled lab o ur force is a stable  m igra­
tio n  equilibrium , while regions w ith  a larger in itia l share of high-skilled 
workers will only a ttr a c t  m ore workers w hen m ig ration  ra tes are not 
too  high.
1 In trod u ction
T he im portance of knowledge spillovers is well understood in th e  litera tu re  
on regional grow th disparities. Knowledge spillovers are seen key to  generat­
ing grow th and explaining grow th differences across regions. T he exten t to
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which knowledge spills over across regions is typically rela ted  to  geograph­
ical distance. Em pirical evidence suggests th a t knowledge spillovers seem 
to  be geographically localized (e.g. Jaffe et al., 1993; Asheim and G ertler, 
2005), which has been taken  up in th e  litera tu re  by adding distance decay 
effects to  th e  ex tent to  which knowledge can cross regional boundaries. In 
th e  new-econom ic-geography-cum-growth litera tu re  th is has am ounted to  a 
param eterization  of regional knowledge spillovers th a t allows for a specifica­
tion  where knowledge spillovers are purely local (’local spillover m odels’) and 
specifications th a t exhibit perfect interregional knowledge spillovers (’global 
spillover m odels ’)1
O ne possible explanation for th e  localization of knowledge spillovers is 
th e  fact th a t th e  transm ission of knowledge is enhanced by th e  geographi­
cal proxim ity of th e  sender and th e  receiver. In particu la r th e  transm ission 
of non-codified knowledge would require direct in teraction to  be effective, 
which is obviously easier when one is (geographically) close. The im portance 
of being proxim ate becom es even greater when tak ing  into account sociolog­
ical views on hum an interaction, where th e  ease of in teraction and  m utual 
understanding  is rela ted  to  a shared sense of social belonging. G roups of 
persons th a t are geographically close from the ir “own im agined com m unity” 
(Anderson, 1983), in which specific rules for com m unication and behaviour 
exist. Belonging to  such a com m unity increases in teraction and  m utual un­
derstanding.
M igration is one channel th a t enhances th e  cross-border transm ission of 
knowledge. The litera tu re  on m igration em phasizes th a t m igration is a po­
ten tia l benefit for receiving regions (’brain  gain’), where it would pose a cost 
for sending regions (’brain  d ra in ’).2. W hen highly-educated individuals move 
from one country or region to  another, th is  is a logical assessm ent. However, 
if one takes into account th a t learning from others require m utual under­
1See Baldwin et al. (2003) for an overview.
2Kuznetsov and Sabel (2006) show th a t sending regions may benefit from positive 
knowledge spillovers after migrants have returned home. See Katseli et al. (2006) for a 
general review of empirical findings on the knowledge effects for sending countries, among 
other things. The literature on the effects of migration on host countries has focused 
on the potentially negative effects on employment and wages, in particular of low-skilled 
workers in advanced countries (e.g. Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Borjas, 1999).
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standing, a p icture emerges th a t m itigates th e  one-way flow of knowledge.
F irst, m igration plays a role in reducing th e  distance between regions. 
This can be understood by th e  framework developed by Paasi (1996) th a t re­
lates socio-spatial in tegration to  regional identities. His framework combines 
one’s original identity  ( “we” and “o ther” ) w ith  one’s current location ( “here” 
and “th e re” ), yielding four options of socio-spatial integration. The first two 
options deal w ith  original residents of b o th  “here” and  “th e re” , while the  
o ther two deal w ith m igrants, who have entered th e  o ther region. In tim e, 
m igration implies th a t th e  regional identities of th e  two regions becom e in­
terwoven, which reduces th e  distance between them , facilitating cross-border 
learning. T he effect of m igration in th is respect will be particu larly  strong 
when regional identities are not proxim ate, which we believe is highly corre­
lated  w ith geographical distance.
Second, as b o th  econom ists (Glaeser et al., 2002; K nack and  Keefer, 
1997) and sociologists (G ranovetter, 1973; Coleman, 1988) have claimed, 
m utual understanding  also strongly depends on th e  social ties individuals 
m ain tain  w ith each other. S trong social ties lower th e  costs of exchanging 
inform ation, not only because of access to  previously established networks of 
knowledge, b u t also since repu ta tions are built when individuals frequently 
in teract. Em pirical evidence for th is is provided by Singh (2005), O ettl and 
Agrawal (2008) and K err (2008). All of them  conclude th a t enduring social 
ties between individuals stim ulate th e  spreading of knowledge across regions .3
These insights imply th a t b o th  m igration and  social ties are im portan t 
to  overcome th e  distance decay effect of knowledge spillovers. W hen people 
move to  ano ther region, m utual understanding  will be stim ulated  through 
explicit com m unication w ith  people from th e  previously denounced “o ther” 
region, w ith  social ties being an im portan t m oderating factor. This holds 
b o th  for th e  receiving region, where m igrants bring the ir knowledge and
3To give one specific example, Agrawal et al. (2008) use patent data to  investigate 
the importance of socially induced knowledge spillovers. They find a substitution effect 
between spatial proximity and social proximity. While co-location facilitates knowledge 
spillovers, co-ethnicity plays a significant role in knowledge diffusion when distance in­
creases. The marginal increase in knowledge spillovers between ethnically related inven­
tors living 1,000 miles apart is equal to 5 percent, while a distance of 3,000 miles increases 
the degree of knowledge spillovers by 13 percent.
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com m unicate about it w ith  th e  local population, as well as for th e  sending 
region. However, social ties will m ost likely m ainly stim ulate knowledge 
transfer to  th e  sending region. Social relationships will be m aintained w ith 
existing, previously established networks of colleagues, friends and family in 
th e  region of origin. W ith  such pervasive networks (still) absent for m igrants 
in th e  receiving region, th is  implies th a t th e  odds of benefitting from cross­
region learning are against th e  receiving region.
This paper uses a theoretical m odel to  analyse th e  effect of m igration 
and enduring social relationships on regional production and  growth. O ur 
m odel combines insights of w ell-established models on grow th and m igra­
tion, yet breaks new ground by incorporating social bonding as an im portan t 
channel for knowledge spillovers th rough m igration. T he basic framework 
underlying our analysis is th e  2-region, 3-sector, 2-factor m odel by Fujita  
& Thisse (2003), in which trad e  costs, m igration of high-skilled workers 
and regional grow th jo in tly  determ ine th e  spatial division of economic ac­
tiv ity  across regions. In the ir analysis, knowledge spillovers are im portan t 
for regional grow th, yet only indirectly rela ted  to  m igration by a s tandard  
distance-decay effect. We explicitly model th e  relationship  between m igra­
tion  and knowledge spillovers, m aking it dependent on th e  m igration ra te  
as well as on th e  size of th e  sending region. T he former aspect em phasizes 
th a t m igration is a prim e channel for knowledge spillovers to  occur; th e  la t­
te r aspect acknowledges th a t th e  im pact of social ties depends on how m any 
people move and how m any stay  behind.
O ur results show th a t in such a setting  th e  full agglom eration of high- 
skilled workers th a t are engaged in R & D  activities is not a straightforw ard 
outcome. T he equilibrium  w ith  an equally dispersed high-skilled labour force 
is a stable m igration equilibrium , while regions w ith a larger initial share of 
high-skilled workers will only a ttra c t more workers when m igration ra tes are 
not too high. If m igration becomes too  high, th e  advantage in num bers 
of th e  larger region is com pensated by a disadvantage of benefitting  less 
from knowledge spillovers th a n  th e  receiving region. W hen social ties are 
im portan t in generating knowledge spillovers, th e  full agglom eration of high- 
skilled workers in one region is not a t all certain. In  such a case, grow th is
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however not optim al, so th a t th e  trade-off between reaching optim al grow th 
and equal d istribu tion  of economic activ ity  rem ains.
T he s truc tu re  of th e  paper is as follows. Section 2 sum m arizes th e  m ain 
set-up of th e  Fu jita  & Thisse (2003) model, as it lays th e  groundwork for 
th e  analysis to  come. Section 3 further discusses th e  im portance of social 
ties for th e  generation of knowledge and th e  im plications th is has for knowl­
edge spillovers across regional borders. This section also proposes how to  
tran sla te  these insights into a m odelling framework. Section 4 discusses the  
im plications for convergence and optim al grow th of m odelling m igration as 
an im portan t channel for knowledge spillovers. Section 5 concludes.
2 T he Fujita & T h isse  (2003) m odel
T he m odel we employ to  show th e  im portance of m igration for regional 
grow th and location of m anufacturing is th a t of Fu jita  & Thisse, 2003 (hence­
forth  Fu jita  & Thisse). In th is section we will briefly discuss th e  m ain struc­
tu re  of the ir m odel and we will highlight some of the ir key equations and 
results. We use the ir m odel because it captures th e  m ain elem ents required 
for a discussion on th e  relevance of m igration in a geography-cum -growth 
model. T heir framework offers an analytically  trac tab le  framework where 
geography, m igration and grow th in teract to  explain regional grow th and 
income disparities in relation to  regional agglom eration p a tte rn s .4
T he Fu jita  & Thisse m odel assumes a two-region, th ree  sector economy, 
w ith two factors of production. We will label th e  regions r  and s, mnemonics 
for receiving and  sending region as will becom e clear later. The two pro­
duction factors are low-skilled labour (L) and high-skilled labour (H). The 
division of low-skilled workers across regions is even and fixed, w hereas the  
division of high-skilled workers across regions is endogenous, w ith  Ar and 
As =  1 — Ar denoting th e  respective H -shares of th e  receiving and sending 
region. T he th ree  sectors are a trad itiona l sector (T-sector), a m anufacturing
4Other papers th a t have highlighted migration in a geography-cum-growth framework 
are Walz (1996), Baldwin and Forslid (2000) and Hirose (2005). These contributions have 
in common th a t they are less tractable then the Fujita & Thisse framework.
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sector (M -sector) and an investm ent good sector (I-sector).
T he trad itiona l sector is perfectly com petitive, a t each point in tim e pro­
ducing goods w ith a constant re tu rns to  scale technology, using low-skilled 
labour only. T here are no tran sp o rta tio n  costs involved in selling T-goods 
across regional borders so th a t th e  T-sector can serve as num eraire sector. 
By appropria te  choice of un its th is  implies a wage ra te  of one for low-skilled 
labour in bo th  regions: wr =  w s =  1. Each period consum ers spend a fixed 
share 1 — ^  of the ir to ta l expenditures on trad itional goods, which is assum ed 
sufficiently large to  always sustain  production  in b o th  regions.
T he rem aining share ^  of consum er expenditures is spent on m anufac­
tu ring  varieties, which are produced in th e  M -sector. Consum ers exhibit a 
Dixit-Stiglitz-like love of variety w ith  a  > 1 as th e  fixed elasticity  of su bstitu ­
tion. Accordingly, m anufacturing varieties are produced under m onopolistic 
com petition and  increasing re tu rns to  scale. T he production of a m anufac­
tu ring  variety requires th e  exclusive use of a pa ten t, which is to  be acquired 
from th e  investm ent good sector. In  addition, m anufacturing production  re­
quires one unit of low-skilled labour to  actually  produce th e  good. The to ta l 
costs of m anufacturing production thus consists of a fixed cost th a t equals 
th e  price paid  for th e  pa ten t and  a m arginal cost of one, th e  wage ra te  of 
low-skilled workers. Selling m anufacturing ou tp u t in th e  o ther region carries 
iceberg-type of tran sp o rta tio n  costs Y >  1 : in order to  sell an  am ount q in 
th e  o ther region, an am ount of Y • q >  q m ust be shipped.
T he I-sector provides pa ten ts  for new m anufacturing varieties, using high- 
skilled workers only. T he productiv ity  of high-skilled workers in producing 
pa ten ts  depends on past ideas and innovations, im plying a positive techno­
logical spillover as in Rom er (1990). M ore specifically,
h ( j ) =  a M
Ki
Ui =
r-Ai "1-Ai
h ( j )0 dj +  W  h ( j  )0 dj 
J 0
M  [Xi +  V(1 -  Ai)]1//3
0
1/0
KiAi
(1 )
(2 )
(3)
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for i =  r ,s .  In these equations, h ( j ) denotes personal knowledge of high- 
skilled workers, which is th e  same in b o th  regions by its dependence on the  
world-wide num ber of m anufacturing varieties M . T he param eter a  is a gen­
eral p roductiv ity  param eter of individual learning. T he production  of paten ts 
in a region is U. I t depends on th e  num ber of high-skilled workers involved in 
th e  region’s I-sector, indicated by Ai ,5 as well as on th e  productiv ity  of each 
worker K i . T he la tte r  is th e  regional knowledge stock, which is th e  result 
of com plem entary in teraction between all high-skilled workers (0 < ft < 1 ), 
wherever they  reside. However, th e  contribu tion  of th e  personal knowledge 
of high-skilled workers from th e  o ther region is ham pered by a fixed distance 
decay effect: 0 <  ^  <  1 .
Equations (1)-(2) im ply th a t individual learning is perfect and indepen­
dent of where high-skilled workers reside, b u t th a t high-skilled p roductiv ity  
in generating pa ten ts  is region-specific, as in localized spillovers models. This 
has im portan t im plications for optim al grow th in th e  Fu jita  & Thisse model, 
where th e  economy-wide grow th ra te  depends on th e  num ber of new ly-created 
m anufacturing varieties: M =M =  g(Ar ) =  [ArK r (Ar ) +  (1 — Ar) K s(Ar )] =M . 
W ith  im perfect knowledge spillovers, th is implies th a t grow th will be highest 
when all high-skilled workers agglom erate in one region, th a t is when either 
Ar or As is one. W hen high-skilled workers are fully dispersed, grow th is 
lowest. This makes m igration v ita l for reaching optim al grow th in th e  Fujita  
& Thisse framework.
W here high-skilled workers will locate depends on th e  real wage they  will 
receive, as custom ary in new economic geography m odels .6 Since only the  
high-skilled work in th e  I-sector, and assum ing free en try  and  exit of firms in 
th e  I-sector, high-skilled wages are directly rela ted  to  th e  price of a paten t. 
T he m arket price of a pa ten t n i should equal th e  unit costs of producing a 
paten t. Hence,
w- =  niK i(A i)
5The total mass of high-skilled workers is set to  one, Hr + H s = 1.
6 A part from wages, high-skilled workers also own assets in the form of shares in man­
ufacturing firms. As will become clear, this is irrelevant for the location decision of high- 
skilled workers.
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is th e  equilibrium  (nominal) wage of high-skilled workers in either region.
T he real wage also depends on th e  location of m anufacturing production 
though. Since M -goods carry tran sp o rta tio n  costs, regions producing more 
m anufacturing varieties will have a lower price index, m aking it a ttrac tive  
for high-skilled labour to  m igrate to  th a t region. T he location decision of 
m anufacturing firms, in tu rn , depends on consum er expenditures. F irm s 
prefer being close to  the ir po ten tia l m arket, to  save on tran sp o rta tio n  costs.
T he m igration of high-skilled workers to  a region therefore makes it a ttrac tive  
for m anufacturing firms to  move there  as well, giving rise to  a dem and- 
linked cum ulative causation effect. On th e  o ther hand, low-skilled labour is 
immobile across regions so th a t some tran sp o rta tio n  costs will always have 
to  be incurred. Moreover, tran sp o rta tio n  costs im ply a b e tte r  shield against 
foreign com petition in sm aller regions, m aking it a ttrac tiv e  to  locate in the  
sm aller region. Depending on th e  level of trad e  costs, th is  m arket-crow ding 
effect m ay dom inate th e  dem and-linked circular causality effect, as custom ary 
in new economic geography models. Since th e  location of pa ten t production 
is irrelevant to  th e  location decision of m anufacturing firm s7, Fu jita  & Thisse 
find th a t when tran sp o rta tio n  costs are high, m anufacturing production will 
always take place in b o th  regions, irrespective of th e  division of high-skilled 
workers. For sufficiently low tran sp o rta tio n  costs m anufacturing production 
tends to  agglom erate in th e  region th a t has th e  higher share of high-skilled 
labour.
A part from being a new economic geography framework, th e  Fu jita  & 
Thisse model also features growth, requiring insight in how consumers de­
term ine the ir optim al consum ption p a th s  and  how th is depends on pa ten t 
production and  m igration decisions. Fu jita  & Thisse (2003: 125-126) assum e 
th a t all consum ers choose an expenditure p a th  " j ( t ) , j  =  L , H  w hereas the  
mobile high-skilled consumers also choose an optim al location p a th  i H (t) 2  
{■r , sg. Indirect u tility  for consum er j  a t tim e t  is given by Uj(t) =  "j(t)[Pij(t)(t)]~M, 
w ith Pij (t) th e  price index of th e  M-good in region of residence i a t tim e t. 
However, moving between regions incurs a psychological cost C (t) th a t is
7Patents are assumed to  be freely transm ittable across regions and once the patent has 
been acquired, the manufacturing firm can choose freely where to locate.
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expressed in units of lifetime utility. This implies lifetime u tility  of
1  __
e~7t ln[vj (t)]dt — e~l l C  (th), 
h
where th e  la tte r  p a rt is only relevant for high-skilled workers and  where j  > 0 
is th e  subjective discount ra te  th a t is th e  same for all consumers. Preferences 
are in tertem poral CES w ith  unit elasticity  of in tertem poral substitu tion .
High-skilled workers hold assets as well, which takes th e  form of an equal 
share in all m anufacturing firms. Low-skilled worker do not hold assets. The 
assets yield an interest ra te  v(t)  th a t is determ ined in perfectly com petitive 
bond m arkets th a t are freely accessible to  all consumers, wherever they  re­
side. Following B arro and Sala-i-M artin (1995: 66) th e  in tertem poral budget 
constrain t is w ritten  as:
/ £j ( t ) e -v(t)tdt =  aj +  Wj  (0), j  =  L , H  
J 0
w ith aL =  0 and  aH > 0 and where V =  (1 /t)  f0  v ( r ) d r  denotes th e  average 
interest ra te  between 0 and  t. T he te rm  W j (0) =  e~v(t)twrj(t)(t)d t is the  
present value of th e  consum er’s wage income over time. N ote th a t for low- 
skilled workers w  =  1 a t all tim es in b o th  regions. For any given location 
path , th e  optim al consum ption p a th  is governed by th e  fam iliar Euler condi­
tion, " j ( t ) /" j ( t)  =  u (t) — j .  Since th is m ust hold for all consumers, th is  also 
determ ines th e  aggregate expenditure p a th  E ( t ) / E (t).
Given th is set-up, and under th e  expectation  th a t m igration takes place 
to  th e  receiving region r , Fu jita  & Thisse show th a t th e  m igration ra te  of 
high-skilled workers a t tim e t  is governed by:
A(t) =  —elt  ln 
1
aH +  W  (0, t) 
a n  +  W  (0, T ) _
f-T
i t ln Pr (z)
Lp - M
dz,  (4)
where T  is th e  point in tim e beyond which high-skilled labourers would not 
w ant to  postpone m igration and  where — is th e  speed of ad justm ent in work­
ers’ m igration. The equation essentially says th a t m igration depends on a
e
t
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com parison of real re tu rns between moving to  r  a t tim e t  and T , under the  
expectation  th a t high-skilled workers indeed move from s to  r .8
This finalizes th e  set-up of th e  Fu jita  & Thisse model. Focusing on steady 
s ta te  grow th paths, th e  next step is to  determ ine how th e  location of m an­
ufacturing production  and high-skilled workers in teract to  explain persis­
ten t income divergence across regions. Their results are sum m arized in two 
propositions. P roposition  1 (Fujita & Thisse, 2003: 140) shows th a t when 
pa ten ts  are freely mobile, only stable spatial configurations can be a tta ined  
th a t involve full agglom eration of high-skilled labour in one region. Provided 
tran sp o rta tio n  costs are sufficiently low, also m anufacturing production will 
agglom erate in th a t region. For higher tran sp o rta tio n  costs m anufacturing 
production is dispersed, w ith  th e  m ajor share in th e  region where high-skilled 
labour agglomerates. P roposition  2 (Fujita & Thisse, 2003: 143) deals w ith 
th e  welfare effects for workers in b o th  regions, establishing a trade-off be­
tween s tandard  new economic geography core-periphery welfare effects of 
high-skilled agglom eration and optim al grow th effects. If th e  additional 
grow th boosted by agglom erating R&D in one region is sufficiently large, 
core-periphery grow th pa th s  Pareto-dom inate  grow th pa th s w ith  a sym m et­
rically dispersed R&D sector for all types of labour involved (low-skilled 
labour, skilled labour in r  and  skilled labour in s ).
3 K now ledge spillovers and social ties
T he key reason for th is paper is th e  im portance of social ties in generat­
ing knowledge and  its consequences for knowledge spillovers across regional 
boundaries. Before discussing how we will incorporate th is in th e  model 
of Fu jita  & Thisse (2003), we first elaborate a b it more on learning across 
regional borders.
In general, individuals learn by getting  form al education or by gather­
ing practical experience. However, they  also profit from knowledge spillovers
8 Since the equation has been derived under the assumption th a t people are indifferent 
between moving at T  and t, it also gives what a migrant would be willing to pay to  move 
at time t  rather than on time T  (Fukao & Bénabou, 1993).
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th a t arise from th e  nonrival public good na tu re  of knowledge (Arrow, 1962). 
By building system s th rough  which individuals can acquire knowledge, soci­
eties unintentionally  enlarge individual knowledge by generating knowledge 
spillovers. As alluded to  in th e  in troduction, th e  existence of knowledge 
spillovers is well understood  in th e  litera tu re  on regional grow th disparities, 
relating it to  geographical distance. The em pirical evidence on th e  m a tte r 
(e.g. Jaffe et al., 1993; Asheim and G ertler, 2005) has been taken  up by pa­
ram eterizing a distance decay effects regarding regional knowledge spillovers, 
allowing for knowledge spillovers th a t are only local, entirely global, or any­
th ing  in between, see Baldwin et al. (2003) for an overview and for details 
of specification. T he Fu jita  & Thisse (2003) framework clearly fits in this 
trad ition .
A possible explanation for th e  localization of knowledge spillovers is th a t 
knowledge is created  in such a way th a t p a rt of it rem ains unclear to  others 
(scientists, firms, workers). As if knowledge consisted of two parts: a codified 
p a rt and a non-codified p a rt (Polanyi, 1966; Agrawal, 2006). T he codified 
elem ents are easily accessible and  applicable to  o thers in society and could 
easily spill over. T he non-codified elem ents are harder to  absorb. Some p arts  
rem ain tac it, either because incentives to  codify all knowledge are lacking, or 
because it is im possible to  do so (Powell and  Swart, 2005). D irect in teraction 
w ith th e  creator of knowledge is thus required to  be able to  fully use it, which 
is obviously easier when one is (geographically) close.
W hen tak ing  into account sociological views on interaction, th e  im por­
tance of geographical proxim ity is even greater. T he ease of in teraction is 
then  rela ted  to  th e  sense of social belonging th a t individuals experience. Each 
group of persons th a t is geographically close has a na tu ra l urge to  form its 
“own im agined com m unity” (Anderson, 1983), in which for every com m unity 
certain  specific ground rules and behaviour exist. As a result, all societies will 
claim to  be different from one another, giving rise to  a sense of “us” versus 
“them ” . Belonging to  th e  same com m unity therefore increases in teraction 
and understanding.
Paasi (1996) analyses th is notion, using a framework th a t bases forms 
of socio-spatial in tegration and  distinction on differing regional identities.
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Paasi identifies two scales of socio-spatial integration; on th e  one hand there 
is one’s original identity  (thus “we” or “o ther” ), on th e  o ther hand there  is 
one’s current location (thus “here” or “th e re” ). T he com bination of these 
two scales yields four options of socio-spatial integration; th e  first two options 
deal w ith  original residents of b o th  “here” and  “there” , while th e  o ther two 
deal w ith  m igrants, who have entered th e  o ther region. At some point in tim e 
regional identities of th e  two regions becom e interwoven, as th e  residents of 
b o th  regions becom e less and  less d istinct from th e  m igrants entering the ir 
region. As Paasi argues, th is  is because th e  identity  of a region is m ostly 
expressed in structu res of expectations. I t weaves together elem ents which 
are significant in th e  institu tions and habits of a region, which in tu rn  depend 
on people’s interactions.
This implies th a t regional knowledge stocks can be different in content 
a t first, due to  different regional identities, inhibiting instantaneous learning 
from regions th a t are not geographically close. Moreover, to  be able to  tran s­
fer th e  tac it p a rts  of th e  knowledge stock also requires m utual understanding. 
As b o th  econom ists (G laeser et al., 2002; K nack and  Keefer, 1997) and so­
ciologists (G ranovetter, 1973; Coleman, 1988) claim, th e  la tte r  is enhanced 
by strong ties am ongst individuals. S trong ties lower th e  costs of exchanging 
inform ation, not only because of access to  previously established networks of 
knowledge, b u t also since repu ta tions are built when individuals frequently 
in teract. Em pirical evidence for th is is provided by Singh (2005), O ettl and 
Agrawal (2008) and  K err (2008).
W ith  social ties being of crucial im portance for cross-regional knowledge 
spillovers, m igration becomes an im portan t channel th rough  which th e  dis­
tance decay effect of knowledge spillovers can be overcome. W hen people 
move to  ano ther region, m utual understanding  will be stim ulated  through 
explicit com m unication w ith  people from th e  previously denounced “o ther” 
region. Knowledge of th e  o ther region becom es accessible. This holds b o th  
for th e  region of im m igration, where m igrants bring the ir knowledge and 
com m unicate abou t it w ith  th e  locals, as well as for th e  region of em igration. 
Especially if m igrants re ta in  the ir social relationships w ith  those they  leave 
behind, the ir newly acquired knowledge will spill over to  the ir old region.
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To incorporate these findings in th e  Fu jita  & Thisse model in a sensible 
m anner requires striking th e  right balance between analytical rigour and 
tractability . As such, we re ta in  th e  m ain set-up of th e  Fu jita  & Thisse 
model, bu t change th e  way knowledge spillovers occur, re la ting  it explicitly 
to  m igration. O ur changes relate to  th e  individual learning specification, 
equation (1 ), as well as to  assigning m igration a key role in th e  transm ission 
of knowledge from abroad, equation (2). T he way regional knowledge stocks 
affect high-skilled productiv ity  and pa ten t production rem ains as in Fujita  
& Thisse.
R egarding individual learning we assume, in line w ith th e  above, th a t 
learning implies getting  to  understand  b o th  th e  ta c it and  codified com ponent 
of existing knowledge. R egarding tac it knowledge we rela te  th is to  social 
in teraction w ith  th e  local labour force, while learning about th e  codified 
knowledge p a rt is m odelled by rela ting  it to  th e  m anufacturing varieties th a t 
are around. A ttaching a weight 0 <  5 <  1 to  indicate th e  relative im portance 
of these two com ponents, we get:
h i ( j ) =  a \ si M i- s (5)
where all variables are as before. We add a subscript i =  r, s to  em phasize 
th a t individual learning is (partly) region specific. Individuals learn about 
th e  tac it com ponent of knowledge from social in teraction w ith residents from 
the ir own region, while they  also learn from th e  codified knowledge th a t is 
im plicit in each m anufacturing variety. Eq. (5) includes Fu jita  & T hisse’s 
(2003) specification as a special case (5 =  0).
As in Fu jita  & Thisse th e  hum an capital stock of societies is based on 
an accum ulation of individual knowledges. However, m igration is required 
to  benefit from knowledge from th e  o ther region:
K r = hr ( . j f  dj +  Vr hs(j  )P dj
10
1 /P
(6)
Ks  =
r\s
hs(j  f  dj +  Vs hr ( j Y dj
0
1 /P
(7)
r
0
0
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where 0 <  v r ,Vs <  1 are region-specific distance decay effects th a t depend 
on m igration .9
T he exact specification of Vi requires some thought. F irst, V should rely 
on th e  m igration rate , for th a t is th e  m ain channel through which knowledge 
spills over from other regions in our framework. W hen m igration increases 
more knowledge can be transm itted , while zero m igration would im ply th a t 
no knowledge spillovers can be reaped. Second, one incoming worker is un­
likely to  make a substan tial difference in th e  receiving region, bu t its im pact 
on th e  region of origin will be more substan tial. Hence, in general we require 
Vs > Vr . B ut here social ties come into play, which are more prom inent the  
sm aller th e  sending region is. W hat is learned in th e  new region m ay then  
be easily shared w ith old friends and  colleagues who stayed a t hom e .10 Con­
sequently, V should also depend on regional size. T he larger th e  receiving 
region, th e  less substan tial will be th e  im pact of incoming m igrants. The 
larger th e  group left behind, th e  less likely it is th a t knowledge spills over 
from th e  receiving to  th e  sending region. Finally, we w ant V to  be m axim ally 
one to  ensure th a t th e  knowledge stock cannot be larger th a n  would be the  
case when all high-skilled workers live in th e  same region.
T he following specification for V satisfies these considerations:
Vr =  As • (1 -  Ar) and  Vs =  As • (1 +  As)Ar. (8)
It establishes th a t th e  knowledge stock of a region consists of individual 
knowledges of th e  ’own’ region and th a t of o ther regions, provided there 
is m igration th a t helps to  overcome incongruities in understanding  a n d /o r 
knowledge bases. W hen _s is zero, no spillovers occur, Vs > Vr for all levels
9 While empirical literature shows distance m atters for the magnitude of knowledge 
spillovers, e.g. Jaffe et al. (1993) and Asheim and Gertler (2005), we will ignore distance 
in absolute terms in the remainder of the analysis. Socially induced knowledge spillovers 
work as a way to overcome mental distance, and as such leave absolute distance relatively 
unim portant for knowledge diffusion, as confirmed by the analysis of Agrawal et al. (2008).
10  We do not differentiate between the degree of social ties here. It does not m atter in 
the model whether high-skilled workers are socially tied on direct relationships (family, 
former work colleagues or classmates) or on indirect relationships (graduated at the same 
university, common friends). The model tries to establish the effect of social ties on regional 
disparities, and the current setup suffices for that.
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of Ar and As, and  dVs/dA s < 0, dVr/d A r < 0 .11
S ubstitu ting  for (5) in (6) and (7) yields th e  final equations for th e  regional 
knowledge stocks:
K i  =  M i- s Ai+&^ +  Vi(1 -  Ai)1+sp
1/P
i =  r ,s . (9)
where we applied Ar +  As =  1 and pu t a  =  1 for convenience. For no ta tional
convenience we define k  =
i/P
for i =  r, s so th a t|A,1+sp +  Vi(1 -  Ai)1+sP
K i =  M 1_ski . T he equation shows some resem blance w ith equation (2), Fu- 
j i ta  & T hisse’s equation for regional knowledge stocks. It differs clearly how­
ever regarding th e  way knowledge spillovers occur between regions, reserving 
a central role for m igration. Moreover, we have supplied a m icro-foundation 
for th e  region-specificity of knowledge stocks.
4 M igration , socia l tie s  and regional conver­
gence
In th e  Fu jita  & Thisse framework grow th would be optim al if all high-skilled 
labour agglom erates in one region. This will not be different in our model 
since it is a logical outcom e of having im perfect cross-regional knowledge 
spillovers.12 G row th is rela ted  to  th e  generation of new m anufacturing vari­
eties world wide as follows:
g =  M / M  =  M  s Arkr (Ar , As) +  Asks(Ar , As) (10 )
1 1  Note th a t this would imply th a t once people have migrated their potential to  act as a 
channel for spillovers ceases to  exist. The implicit assumption therefore is th a t social ties 
only play a role during or just after the actual migration phase. This assumption is however 
not restrictive in steady-state migration equilibrium, as this requires zero migration.
12 This would of course be different had we assumed th a t migrants do not easily blend 
in with their new environment. In th a t case, learning across individuals would not be 
perfect, as it would depend on the shared geographical background of residents.Since the 
purpose of this paper is to  focus on migration and social ties as im portant mechanisms for 
cross-border learning, we leave this option for future research.
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since M  =  (nr +  n s) =  ^2i AiK i as pa ten ts  are footloose. Also in the  
m igration-induced knowledge spillover m odel th e  grow th ra te  of m anufac­
tu ring  varieties is highest when all high-skilled agglom erate in one region. 
The question is therefore: will high-skilled workers agglom erate in one re­
gion, and, if so, to  w hat extent?
T he answer lies in an investigation of th e  stab ility  of dispersed equilibria, 
as custom ary in new economic geography models. For each value of 0 <  
Ar <  1 it m ust be checked w hether th is is an  equilibrium  th a t involves no 
(further) m igration, and, if so, w hether th is is a stab le equilibrium  in the  
sense th a t a small additional movement of labour would imply m igration 
flows leading back to  Ar . To shed light on th is issue recall th a t m igrants 
essentially com pare th e  real re tu rns between moving to  th e  receiving region 
r  and staying in th e  sending region s , where real wages also depend on the  
location of m anufacturing production. T he in troduction  of social ties as 
an im portan t factor for knowledge accum ulation does not alter th is basic 
m echanism .13 In  steady-sta te  m igration equilibrium , where workers choose 
to  not longer m igrate, th e  com parison of real re tu rns of m igration boils down 
to:
Ur =  7  +  kr(Ar) / Pr ( t ) \  ^ ) (1 1 )
^  =  T + k U A s i K  P m )  =  s (A r)’ (11)
where it has been assum ed th a t m igration takes place from region s to  region 
r. In (11), Vj(t) =  £j(t)[Pij(t)(t)] ^ is indirect u tility  a t tim e t  and individual 
expenditure " j (t) equals a* (A) [7 +  ki (Ai)] in region i =  r, s, w ith  a*(.) denot­
ing to ta l asset value of m anufacturing firms (see Fu jita  & Thisse, 2003: 136-7 
for fu rther details). S teady s ta te  m igration equilibrium  requires $(A r ) =  1.
E quation  (11) makes explicit th a t th e  willingness to  m igrate depends 
on th e  relative productiv ity  of high-skilled workers in b o th  regions as well 
as on relative price indices. In  th e  Fu jita  & Thisse framework, kr/ k s is
13  This would be different had we modelled social ties as a factor in the migration decision 
of individuals as well. This is however beyond the purpose of the current paper. The Fujita 
& Thisse framework incorporates migration costs th a t increases in the rate of migration, 
which could be interpreted as resembling the increased costs of leaving one’s social network. 
A better proxy for it would however be to  include the number of inhabitants staying behind.
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sym m etric around Ar =  1 / 2 , im plying th a t kr R  ks ,  Ar R  1 / 2 . Hence, 
in the ir model th e  fully dispersed equilibrium  is a steady-sta te  equilibrium: 
$ (1 /2 )  =  1. W ith  b o th  high-skilled and low-skilled labour evenly d istribu ted  
across regions, also m anufacturing firms will be evenly d istribu ted , equating 
regional price indices. However, th e  sym m etric equilibrium  is not stable. A 
slight change in th e  regional d istribu tion  of workers will imply th a t real wages 
in th e  larger region go up, m aking it a ttrac tiv e  for high-skilled workers to  
move there.
In our framework th is is different, due to  social ties affecting th e  receiving 
and sending region differently. I t implies th a t an  equal division of labour 
across regions is a stable steady-sta te  m igration equilibrium . To see this, note 
th a t for positive m igration rates, q s (1 / 2 ) >  qr (1 / 2 ) and  kr (1 / 2 ) <  k s(1 / 2 ). 
Unlike th e  Fu jita  & Thisse framework, a slightly higher num ber of high- 
skilled workers in region r  implies kr < ks, m aking such a move inconsistent 
in expectations .14 A formal condition settling  this, assum ing for now th a t 
m anufacturing is equally spread across regions (hence Ps =  Pr) and  using 
th e  definitions of k is :15
" As R As(Ar) for Ar < Ar < 1 / 2  
kr R  ks ^  ; (12) 
_s Q  As(Ar ) for Ar < Ar < 1
where As(Ar) =  -------------------[ r /  ^ and where Ar is the  value
(1 -  Ar) -  (1 +  As)Ar jAr/ As]1+^
for Ar a t which th e  denom inator of As(Ar) switches sign .16 For an equal
division of high-skilled workers, As =  0, im plying kr (1/2) <  ks(1 /2 ) for
14In th a t case one would expect high-skilled workers to  move to region s instead. How­
ever, with region s then becoming the receiving nation, such a move would be inconsistent 
in expectations as well.
1//3
• As ) +  Vr K 1+Sl315 It is convenient to  rewrite kr to when doing theAs
calculations.
16 Implying th a t region s would be a receiving rather than a sending region, a point we 
will return to  further below. Numerical simulations show th a t Ar is lower that 1/2 for all 
values of ft and 5, hovering around a value of Ar =  0.45.
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all _s > 0. Moreover, since As(1) =  0 and  As(0) =  1, th e  o ther regional 
d istribu tion  th a t is consistent w ith  a steady-sta te  equilibrium  entailing zero 
m igration and  a sym m etric d istribu tion  of m anufacturing activ ity  is when 
all high-skilled labourers agglom erate in th e  receiving region, th a t is when 
Ar =  1.17
P r o p o s i t io n  1 When social ties are important  fo r  knowledge generation and 
when knowledge spillovers across regions depend on migration, an equilibrium 
with symmetric spreading of  high-skilled labour is a stable migration equilib­
rium.
W hen Ar deviates from 1/2, however, high-skilled workers m ay w ant to  
agglom erate in one region. We recall in th is respect th a t condition (12) has 
been derived under th e  assum ption th a t high-skilled labour m igrates tow ards 
th e  receiving region. In th e  Fu jita  & Thisse m odel th is assum ption is con­
sistent w ith  Ar > 1 /2 . Since in the ir framework th e  spreading of high-skilled 
labour is never a stab le equilibrium , th is assum ption always holds: a slight 
deviation of Ar above 1/2, for w hatever reason, implies m igration tow ards 
region r  until all high-skilled have moved there. T he region w ith  th e  size 
advantage is also th e  region of im m igration. This is clearly different in our 
framework. R etaining our working assum ption th a t m anufacturing activ ity  
is sym m etrically dispersed across regions, (1 2 ) shows th a t only m igration 
ra tes below As(Ar ) are consistent w ith  enduring m igration to  r  as th e  larger 
region. If m igration becomes too high, th e  advantage in num bers of the  
larger region r  is com pensated by th e  disadvantage of benefitting  less from 
knowledge spillovers th a n  th e  receiving region (qr < qs). In  th e  m igration- 
induced spillovers m odel it is not a t all certain  th a t th e  larger region will be 
th e  im m igrant region.
To make these and o ther im plications clear, F igure 1 portrays condition
(1 2 ) as a function of th e  initial d istribu tion  of high-skilled labour across 
regions. The graph  has been draw n for ft =  0.8 and 5 =  0.5 bu t is represen­
ta tive  of all possible com binations of these values. T he dark, solid lines give
17Which could be either of the two regions of course. Which region is actually the 
receiving region is completely endogenous in our model.
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th e  m igration ra tes for which kr =  ks. T he relative m agnitudes of kr and ks 
w ith  respect to  these lines are as indicated by th e  tex t boxes. N ote th a t in 
th e  graph  th e  relevant area for consideration is th e  range of m igration rates 
between 0 and  1. T he lines highlight th a t to  becom e an a ttrac tiv e  region for 
m igration, it is indeed not enough to  be th e  larger region. M igration to  the  
larger region r  will only occur when th e  m igration ra te  does not surpass a 
certain  threshold  of m igration, to  make th e  productiv ity  gain in th e  receiving 
region not higher th a n  in th e  sending region. This stands in sharp  contrast 
to  th e  Fu jita  & Thisse analysis, where m igration does not play a role in de­
term ining knowledge spillovers. In  the ir case, kr R  ks O  Ar R  1 / 2 , which 
is independent of th e  m igration rate.
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
W h a t’s more, F igure 1 also indicates th a t if region r  is initially th e  smaller 
region, th a t is when Ar < 1 /2 , it actually  would becom e th e  sending region. 
To verify w hat th is implies, w arran ts substitu tion  of qs in kr and qr in ks 
when deriving As(Ar ). T he dashed, grey line in Figure 1 therefore portrays 
condition (12) th a t is consistent w ith  r  being th e  sending region .18 The 
underlined tex t boxes indicate th e  relative positions of kr , ks w ith  respect 
to  th is line. I t appears th a t situations w ith  Ar < 1 /2  are in m ost instances 
consistent w ith  seeing r  as a sending region. Only values of Ar ju s t below 
1 / 2  require th a t m igration is not too  high.
Com bining these insights, it appears th a t th e  sending region cannot be 
th e  initially larger region, for th a t would imply ks > kr . This is consistent 
w ith th e  idea th a t to  be a ttrac tiv e  for m igration, a region should have an 
advantage, which in new economic geography-like frameworks is regional size. 
However, for a larger region to  be an im m igrant region, im m igration rates 
should not be too  high, as otherw ise social ties will work against it.
18In th a t case, the denominator of As(Ar ) becomes (1 +  As)Ar — (1 — Ar ) [Ar /A s ]1+/9<5 
while the condition itself remains the same. The value for Ar changes and becomes much 
higher (around 0.9).
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P r o p o s i t io n  2 When social ties are important  fo r  knowledge generation and 
when knowledge spillovers across regions depend on migration, regions should 
have a size advantage to become an immigrant  region. However, a larger 
region only becomes an immigrant region i f  migration rates are below the 
threshold level As(Ar).
We finally relax our working assum ption th a t m anufacturing activ ity  is 
equally divided across regions. To begin w ith, we note th a t in th e  Fujita  
& Thisse framework, th e  decision of m anufacturing firms where to  locate is 
closely rela ted  to  th e  location of high-skilled workers. Since only high-skilled 
workers are mobile across regions, where they  locate m arks th e  difference be­
tween regional expenditure shares. An equal division of high-skilled labour 
implies equal expenditure  shares19 and  since by P roposition  1 th e  sym m etric 
spreading of high-skilled labour is a stable equilibrium , also th e  sym m etric 
equilibrium  spreading of m anufacturing activ ity  will be a stable equilibrium. 
Hence, in contrast to  th e  Fu jita  & Thisse framework, th e  sym m etric equi­
librium  involves b o th  spreading of m anufacturing activ ity  and high-skilled 
labour across regions. W hen m igration is an im portan t channel for knowl­
edge to  spill over, identical regions are a spatia l long-run equilibrium.
P r o p o s i t io n  3 When social ties are important  fo r  knowledge generation and 
when knowledge spillovers across regions depend on migration, initially iden­
tical regions are a stable equilibrium.
W hen regions are not identical initially, th e  s ituation  will be different as 
it can not longer be assum ed th a t m anufacturing firms will be evenly spread 
across regions. As we show in th e  appendix, however, th e  d istribu tion  of m an­
ufacturing firms across regions sustains th e  stab ility  of th e  th ree  s teady-sta te  
m igration equilibria. Moreover, we show th a t, though less likely, also initial 
distribu tions of high-skilled labour th a t deviate from a half could be stable 
spreading equilibria. I t exemplifies th a t it is labour m igration th a t drives 
long-run outcom es, w ith  social ties playing a key role for th e  convergence of 
regions in th e  wake of cross-region knowledge spillovers.
19 See the appendix, where we derive the formal conditions th a t settle where manufac­
turing firms locate.
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5 C onclusion
We have taken th e  Fu jita  & Thisse (2003) grow th-cum -geography m odel to  
investigate th e  im plications of social ties as a m ain reason for generating 
knowledge spillovers across regions th rough  m igration. O ur results show 
th a t in such a setting  th e  full agglom eration of high-skilled workers engaged 
in R&D activities is not a straightforw ard outcom e. T he equilibrium  w ith 
an equally dispersed high-skilled labour force is a stable m igration equilib­
rium , while regions w ith a larger initial share of high-skilled workers will only 
a ttra c t more workers when m igration ra tes are not too  high. If m igration 
becomes too  high, th e  advantage in num bers of th e  larger region is com pen­
sated  by th e  disadvantage of benefitting less from knowledge spillovers th a n  
th e  receiving region. W hen social ties are im portan t in generating knowledge 
spillovers, th e  full agglom eration of high-skilled workers in one region is not a t 
all certain. In  such a case, grow th is however not optim al, so th a t th e  trad e ­
off between reaching optim al grow th and  an equal d istribu tion  of economic 
activ ity  rem ains. However, th is  trade-off may be less sharp in practice, since 
we have assum ed th a t m igrants easily blend in w ith  the ir new environm ent 
and th a t they  establish com plete, new social relationships alm ost im m edi­
ately after they  have m igrated. However, as long as th e  geographical and 
social distance between individuals in different regions is bigger th a n  the  
distance between individuals w ithin th e  same region, a trade-off will remain.
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A  L ocation  o f  m anufacturing firms
In th is appendix we settle  th e  location decision of m anufacturing firms as a 
function of Xr . In  th e  m odel we employ here, th e  m echanism s driving this 
decision are th e  sam e as in th e  Fu jita  & Thisse (2003). From the ir analysis 
we ob ta in
Pr (t) _  (  E , ( K ) (
P,(t)  \ E r  (Xr ),
as th e  m arket outcom e when m anufactures are produced in b o th  regions 
(M r > 0; M ,  > 0). This equation holds as long as relative regional expendi­
tu re  falls w ithin certain  lim its th a t are rela ted  to  th e  level of tran sp o rta tio n  
costs. More specifically, when 0  <  E r/ E ,  < 1 /0  w ith  0  =  a freeness
of trad e  param eter th a t lies between zero and one.
T he expenditure ra tio  is given by
E r (Xr ) L / 2  +  Xr a* (Xr )[^ +  kr (Xr )]
E s(Xr ) L / 2 +  X, a*(Xr )[7  +  k , (Xr )]
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where a*(.) is th e  to ta l asset value of m anufacturing firms, which are owned 
by high-skilled labour (Fujita  & Thisse: 134-135). Following the ir analysis, 
while applying our specifications for kr and  ks, yields:
(Xr =  1 )
(Xr =  1 / 2 ) . (A.2) 
(Xr =  0)
Since qr (1) and ^ ,(0 ) are zero in zero m igration equilibrium , these expressions 
are exactly  identical to  th e  expressions in Fu jita  & Thisse (2003). Hence, 
E r/E , (1 )  =  (a  +  ^ ) / ( a  — ¡J-) and E r /E ,(0 )  =  (a  — ^ ) / ( a  +  ^). Combining 
(A .1 ) and  (A.2), we see th a t when all high-skilled workers reside in region r 
(s), Pr/P ,  < (> ) 1. Moreover, when Xr =  1 /2  price indices are th e  same.
Finally, we note th a t E r/ E , m onotonically increases in Xr , im plying a 
m onotonic decrease of Pr/ P ,  in Xr . Consequently, for in itial values for Xr 
deviating from 1/2 th e  stab ility  conditions will be affected. To see this, we 
note th a t stab ility  of any spreading equilibrium  requires (cf. equation (1 1 )):
E r
=  <
1 /P
1 +
2 i  7  +  v  
a  -  i  7  +  m - 5 r)l/P
1 +
2 i i 1 /P 7  +  Vs
a Vs'
1
i
Ur < V, kr (Xr) <  [(Pr/ P , ) ^  ~  %  +  (Pr /P ,)^  k,(X,).
Since Xr > (< ) 1 /2  implies Pr/ P ,  < (> ) 1, th e  stab ility  of any initial d istrib ­
u tion of high-skilled labour o ther th a n  th e  perfect spreading d istribu tion  will 
be less easily satisfied. This also shows up in th e  expression for th e  threshold 
of m igration below which th e  initial d istribu tion  will be m aintained:
As (Ar )
( P r / P s f  -  [Ar/As]1+P5_| +  [(Pr/ P . s f  ~  I b A f ^
(1 -  Ar) -  (1 +  As)Ar [Ar/ A s]1+PS (Pr /Psf  
For Pr/ P s =  1 th is expression reduces to  th e  threshold  displayed in condi­
tion  (12) in th e  m ain tex t. W hen Pr/ P s < (> ) 1, th e  threshold  decreases 
(increases): d_s(Ar) /d (P r/ P s) > 0, m aking stab ility  less likely.
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Figure 1 : Threshold migration levels
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